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York: Columbia University Press, 2022. ISBN 978-0231-20187-2. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $35.00.
Review by Richard W. Maass
Old Dominion University
Trial-and-error can transform the state. So argues Mark Shirk in Making
War on the World, a svelte monograph on state transformation in
response to transnational violence. Rather than dealing in causal theory, it
emphasizes historical contingency and agency, reminding us that states
could have responded to pirates, anarchists, and terrorists in a variety of
ways. Examining the golden age of piracy during the early 18th century,
anarchist assassinations and bombings around the turn of the 20th
century, and al-Qaida’s jihadist terrorism at the turn of the 21st century,
the book explores how prevailing worldviews shaped states’ initial
responses, how their failures opened the door to creative practices, and
how those practices ended up transforming the state. Primarily aimed at
scholars of state transformation, it is an ambitious study that pushes the
field forward and draws attention to understudied cases.
The book’s central argument holds that “transboundary processes drive
state transformation when they are illegible… when the boundary-drawing
practices that construct the state do not help state agents make sense of
what is happening” (pp. 12-13). Threats that state agents find illegible
“shatter” their prevailing worldviews, prompting them to develop creative
solutions that “reinscribe” the boundaries of the state. Central to this
argument is its conceptualization of states not as relatively fixed
institutions that endure until a revolution or some other critical juncture,
but as patterns of action that impose boundaries of exclusive political
authority on the world’s countless unbounded flows. As such, states are
continually subject to reconstitution by not only political leaders but the
full spectrum of agents who act in their name. This perspective offers an
opportunity to observe subtle shifts in the forms and extent of state
authority over time, an important rejoinder to a field often blinded by
spotlights on major wars and their aftermath. It prompts us to observe
that transformation can occur not just through interstate competition but
through collusion against common threats and diffusion of best practices,
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as well as “from below” when state agents assert authority over subject
populations at the margins of political order.
The meat of the book consists of three richly-detailed case studies of state
interactions with pirates, anarchists, and terrorists, peppering macro-level
narratives with individual vignettes. In each case, aspects of the
contemporary global order facilitated the emergence of transnational
violence threatening state legitimacy. Relying on their existing “conceptual
maps,” state agents misdiagnosed the problem and adopted
counterproductive policy responses, initial failures that eventually gave
way to new approaches that ended up transforming the state. The piracy
case is likely to be of particular interest to many U.S. and European
scholars of international relations, who have tended to focus on the
northeast side of “the line” that divided European politics from Atlantic
colonial competition. England initially offered pardons—which held little
appeal to pirates seeking a life free from organized society—and patrolled
sea lanes with naval vessels too cumbersome for the nimble raiders who
sold stolen trade goods to eager colonial markets. Eventually, the crown
cracked down on lenient colonial governors, extended vice-admiralty
courts directly into the colonies, recognized universal jurisdiction
authorizing any state to prosecute pirates, and launched a propaganda
campaign to stifle their support among the colonists.
Two centuries later, the anarchist movement inspired a rash of highprofile political assassinations and bombings. State agents responded with
broad-based repression and public executions (often inspiring revenge
attacks) as well as deportations and secret agent operations that caused
more problems than they solved. Success came later as states learned to
live with peaceful anarchist ideologues, focused their efforts on the
perpetrators of violence, centralized policing in ways that promoted
international cooperation, and developed methods like fingerprinting and
universal passports for tracking individuals across borders. Finally, U.S.
policymakers responded to al-Qaida’s 9/11 attacks with counterproductive
black site torture programs, border exclusion, and regime-change wars.
Although the scope of state transformation resulting from the War on
Terror remains to be determined, the book identifies drone strikes and
metadata-based surveillance as key ingredients likely to redraw
boundaries of national security, cyberspace, and citizenship.
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These case studies are generally insightful, identifying decentralized and
incremental processes that have transformed states. One missed
opportunity is the lack of engagement with scholarship on terrorism
beyond the third case—both others also highlight themes relevant to the
subject, and more explicit discussion of patterns and lessons would have
offered more for those interested in intelligence or counterterrorism. Some
readers are also likely to push back on aspects of the third case study,
which blames the “War on Terror” narrative on U.S. officials’ inability to
“make sense of” al-Qaida (p. 115), portrays post-9/11 airline security
measures as “attempts to reinforce the boundaries that made al-Qaida
impossible to combat” (p. 115), and argues that torture and regime change
had to fail before the idea of drone strikes could “take hold” (p. 117). While
9/11 obviously facilitated these policy shifts, critics might respond that the
“War on Terror” narrative served U.S. officials’ broader goals, airline
security reflected common-sense measures to prevent similar attacks, and
presidents prior to George W. Bush lacked the capability to employ drone
strikes simply because the technology had not yet been developed.
The larger question of the book’s contribution concerns its central concept
of “legibility.” On one hand, it fits well within the tradition of research on
state agents interpreting new phenomena based on their preexisting
mental frameworks (which are subject to various forms of bias). Yet the
book elides that psychological constraint with two distinct dynamics—
tactical/technological mismatches and threats to state legitimacy—
rendering it something of a catch-all for strategic failure. For instance, it
describes one of the Boston Marathon bombers as illegible to police
because he had hidden outside the area they cordoned off (p. 28), labels
anarchists’ use of dynamite illegible “as it had not been seen before” (p.
83), claims that armed drones “made al-Qaeda legible” (p. 102), and
argues that granting universal jurisdiction made piracy “legible to the
state” (p. 57), each of which reflects tactics or technology rather than state
agents’ ability to comprehend the threats they faced. Similarly, the case
studies treat state agents’ recognition that their legitimacy was threatened
as evidence of their failure to understand transnational threats, but the
former may reflect reasonable assessments of domestic political,
normative, or ontological insecurity, not legibility.
Overall, there is much to appreciate in Making War on the World’s pursuit
of nuanced and contextualized historical understanding, though the
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modesty of its conclusion that transnational violence has played a role
alongside war, economics, and ideas in reshaping state practices may leave
some readers wanting more direct assessment of how much they changed
the course of history. The book lights the way for further research on the
role of legitimacy in threat perception, policymaking, and state
transformation, with the conceptual caveats noted above. It also indicates
further opportunities to explore variations in threat legibility, such as
comparing perceptions of piracy from colonial and imperial perspectives
or exploring how racial hierarchy narratives shaped the legibility of
anticolonial and nationalist terrorism. Scholars interested in transnational
violence and state transformation will find this book a stimulating read.
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